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Summary: The European Union considers conflict resolution 
as a cardinal objective of its foreign policy. It makes use of a 
number of policy instruments  to promote conflict transformation 
through ‘constructive engagement’, which cover a range of sec-
tors affecting conditions and incentives at the micro level. The 
EU has recognised the importance of engaging with civil society 
in situations of violent conflict, but needs to engage more with 
local civil society to make its policies more effective. This brief-
ing aims to aid the understanding  of the role of civil society 
organisations in situations of violent conflict, and the potential 
role of EU policies in enhancing CSOs’ conflict transformation 
efforts. 
•What roles does civil society 
play in situations of violent 
conflict? 
•What might the effects of EU 
policies be on civil society or-
ganisations’ work on conflict?
1. Introduction – the EU and peace 
promotion in the Neighbourhood
The  European  Union,  historically 
conceived  as  a  peace  project,  has 
considered conflict resolution as a 
cardinal  objective  of  its  fledgling 
foreign  policy. The  Lisbon Treaty 
explicitly states that the EU aims to 
promote peace and that its role in 
the world would reflect the princi-
ples that have inspired its creation, 
development and enlargement. 
The EU views as critical “indicators” 
of conflict prevention and resolution 
issues such as human and minority 
rights, democracy, state legitimacy, 
dispute resolving mechanisms, rule 
of law, social solidarity, sustainable 
development and a flourishing civil 
society (Kronenberger and Wouters 
2005). This suggests that the Union 
aims at transforming the structural 
features  of  violent  conflict,  eradi-
cating what Galtung (1969, 1994) 
defines  as  the  seeds  of  structural 
violence:  social  injustice,  unequal 
development  and  discrimination. 
As such, many of its policy instru-
ments can influence conditions and 
incentives at the micro level.
Beyond  foreign  policy  objectives, 
the EU also makes use of policy in-
struments to promote conflict trans-
formation through “constructive en-
gagement” with conflict parties. This 
engagement takes place through the 
deployment of a variety of measures 
of cooperation, including Associa-
tion  Agreements,  Partnership  and 
Cooperation  Agreements,  and,  in 
the  future,  Neighbourhood Agree-
ments under the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is 
intended to share the benefits of the 
EU with neighbouring countries to 
the south and east, and provides fi-
nancial assistance to these countries 
conditional on reforms in a number 
of areas such as economic policy, 
governance and human rights.
The EU has acknowledged the im-
portance of engaging with civil so-
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ciety  to  enhance  its  conflict  reso-
lution  efforts,  but  has  principally 
focussed  on  European  CSOs.  To 
make its policies more effective, it 
must engage more with local CSOs. 
These  often  have  greater  under-
standing,  legitimacy  and  stake  in 
conflict transformation, and can aid 
inter-communal  group  formation, 
mobilisation,  communication  and 
empowerment.
This  briefing  aims  to  aid  the  un-
derstanding of the role of CSOs in 
situations  of  violent  conflict,  how 
the  EU  can  maximise  its  conflict 
transformation  potential  and  what 
the possible pitfalls might be. The 
following sections discuss the role 
that CSOs play in conflict, the ac-
tivities through which they impact 
on conflicts, what determines their 
effectiveness, the role of the EU in 
supporting them, and finally three 
different hypotheses on the poten-
tial impacts of EU Neighbourhood 
policies in transforming conflicts. 
2. Civil Society and its function  
Civil society can be broadly defined 
as the area of voluntary collective 
action, driven by shared values and/
or  interests which operate beyond 
the state, the market and the fam-
ily, and which provides the web of 
social relations linking these three 
spheres (Barnes 2005). Civil soci-
ety  thus  undertakes  an  essentially 
political function in society. 
Civil society can be considered as 
operating at both the grassroots lev-
el (for example community, women, 
student and faith-based groups) and 
the mid-level (for example univer-
sities, research centres, professional 
NGOs, organised crime networks). 
At the top level of society we find 
more powerful, national actors such 
as state bodies, political parties, big 
business and media holdings.
One of civil society’s most impor-
tant functions is how it links these 
three levels. On one hand, mid-level 
CSOs are closely tied to top-level 
policymaking  through  their  inter-
actions with parliaments, big busi-
ness, foundations, etc. On the other, 
mid-level  actors  are  organically 
linked  to  grassroots  CSOs,  which 
are principal agents in the cultiva-
tion of “peace constituencies” in so-
ciety writ large. 
3. Civil society activities in con-
flict
CSOs can contribute directly to a 
conflict and its transformation, for 
example  through  activities  to  fos-
ter  inter-communal  dialogue  or 
encourage  truth  and  reconciliation 
processes;  or  even  conversely  by 
providing the intellectual or moral 
justification for violence. They can 
also  act  indirectly  by  working  on 
issues which might be tied to the 
conflict such as democracy, human 
rights or gender.
Civil  society  activities  can  be  di-
vided  broadly  according  to  their 
method  and  approach.  They  can 
be adversarial, aiming to transform 
conflict by altering power relations 
and  cost-benefit  calculations. This 
could  involve  engaging  in  grass-
roots action aimed at public mobi-
lisation, or mid-level actions aimed 
at  top-level  advocacy,  monitoring 
or shaming. Or they can be non-ad-
versarial,  relying  on  non-coercive 
methods or persuasion and learning 
to induce social change. This could 
include promoting inter-communal 
dialogue.
Such actions deal with either the un-
derlying causes of conflict, through 
training, capacity building and edu-
cation activities; or they might act 
on  the  material  or  psychological 
symptoms of conflict, through op-
erational service delivery. 
4. The impact and effectiveness of 
local civil society in conflict
4.1 - Impact
Civil society impacts on conflict can 
be broadly categorised as fuelling, 
peacemaking and holding. Fuelling 
activities  increase  the  greed  and 
grievance causes of conflict, wors-
ening the incompatibility of subject 
positions between the warring par-
ties.  Conversely,  civil  society  can 
have a peacemaking impact by act-
ing materially to rectify the underly-
ing structural causes of conflict, or 
by discursively contributing to the 
transformation of subject positions. 
A holding impact is when CSOs af-
fect the symptoms of conflict, rather 
than the causes, thus influencing the 
manner in which the incompatibility 
of subject positions manifests itself 
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4.2 – Effectiveness
The effectiveness of CSOs is deter-
mined by five principal factors:
(i)  Rootedness  and  legitimacy  on 
one hand; and organisational, finan-
cial and professional quality on the 
other. It is unusual for organisations 
to excel in both.
(ii) Interconnectedness: The extent 
that CSOs are aware of each other, 
work together and are able to strat-
egise about the most effective divi-
sion  of  labour  between  them  will 
enhance their impact.
(iii) Relationship between the CSO 
and state institutions and the main-
stream media. CSOs which are close 
to or accepted by the state may also 
tend  to  benefit  from  state  support 
and media coverage. However, this 
apparent effectiveness may merely 
be the result of their role in repro-
ducing  the  dominant  discourse  of 
the state. ‘Anti-establishment’ CSOs 
may receive less support and cover-
age but nevertheless be as effective 
as ‘establishment’ CSOs.
(iv) Relations with the international 
community:  Working  with  the  in-
ternational level may raise impact 
by enlisting external supporters. It 
can also raise the status and visibil-
ity of local organisations, and these 
organisations may influence the role 
of external actors to their benefit.
(v) Country-specific and time-con-
tingent factors: The scope for effec-
tive civil society action will depend 
on the laws, institutions and politi-
cal culture of a country, and national 
events and trends. 
5. The EU’s role in supporting lo-
cal civil society conflict transfor-
mation efforts
The European Commission consid-
ers that it has a direct interest in 
working  with  partners  to  promote 
conflict  resolution,  and  the  ENP 
views civil society as a key actor in 
the neighbourhood.
The ENP can affect the civil society 
dimension of conflict in two ways. It 
can affect the structural features of 
conflict, impacting on the political 
opportunity structure in which local 
civil society operates. In this way it 
can shape the effectiveness of civil 
society action, and in particular two 
of  its  critical  determinants:  intra-
civil society relations, and relations 
between CSOs and the state. 
It can also influence CSOs as agents. 
The EU has recognised the need to 
strengthen the civil society aspect of 
the ENP, and proposes to enhance 
the quality and status of local CSOs 
through  training  and  exchanges, 
funding  and  by  encouraging  their 
political role within domestic envi-
ronments.
6. Two fundamental policy ques-
tions and three hypotheses for an-
swering them
In spite of this will to work with civ-
il society in conflict transformation, 
two critical policy questions remain. 
Firstly,  which  CSOs  does  the  EU 
engage with in the neighbourhood, 
and does it correctly identify fuel-
ling actors and activities? Secondly, 
does the ENP succeed in raising the 
effectiveness of CSO peacebuilding 
activities,  or  does  it  inadvertently 
weaken the impact of these activi-
ties?
To answer these two questions we 
set out three hypotheses to aid un-
derstanding  of  the  EU’s  role,  and 
to guide ensuing empirical research 
into conflicts in the neighbourhood. 
These three hypotheses are by no 
means mutually exclusive, and we 
may  well  find  that  features  of  all 
three co-exist within the same con-
flict in the EU neighbourhood. 
1. The liberal peace paradigm
Under this hypothesis the EU con-
tributes  to  conflict  transformation 
by strengthening the structure of lo-
cal civil society by raising the inter-
connectedness  between  mid-level 
and  top-level  actors,  and  between 
mid-level actors and grassroots ac-
tors. It also enhances the agency of 
peacebuilding NGOs whilst weak-
ening or constructively altering the 
views and actions of fuelling NGOs. 
The EU thus ensures that its policies 
do not have negative distortionary 
effects, and  that it builds local ca-
pacities for peace.
2. The leftist critique
Under this hypothesis the very fact 
of engaging with local civil society 
alters  its  nature  and  effectiveness 
in a way detrimental to peace. This 
could happen through:
a. The seeming depoliticisation of 
civil society, whereby EU support 
renders  mid-level  CSOs  technical 
instruments  at  the  service  of  up-
per echelons at national and inter-
national  levels.  This  would  lead 
to  a  growth  of  CSOs  looking  at 
conflict’s symptoms rather than its 
causes,  with  EU  support  going  to 
service based urban NGOs, rather 
than more explicitly political grass-
roots CSOs such as trade unions and 
social movements.
b.  EU  engagement  and  support 
could co-opt civil society and turn it 
into a mouthpiece for EU policies, 
priorities  and  proposed  solutions, 
which  may  be  alien  to  the  needs 
and  desires  of  the  conflict  parties 
themselves  (see  Ferguson  1990). 
The EU would fundamentally shape 
and change the nature of local civil 
society into a dependent functional 
substitute  within  the  paradigm  of 
EU  foreign  policy,  detaching  and 
de-legitimising it in the eyes of the 
public. POLICY BRIEFING 3 JUNE 2008
3. The realist critique
This hypothesis assumes that con-
flict  is  fundamentally  driven  by 
the top levels of society. Civil so-
ciety can thus only be effective to 
the extent that the top levels allow 
it space to operate. This space is of-
ten limited in conflict situations as 
governments are often authoritarian   
in these contexts. According to this 
hypothesis,  unless  the  EU  exerts 
pressure on top-level actors to un-
dertake democratic reform, then it 
is unlikely to induce conflict trans-
formation.
Conclusion
In  order  to  analyse  these  issues, 
MICROCON’s  research  Work 
Package, ‘Conflict in the European 
Neighbourhood’  will  examine  16 
CSOs in each of five conflicts in the 
neighbourhood:  Georgia  and  Ab-
khazia; Moldova  and Transnistria; 
Nagorno  Karabakh;  Morocco  and 
Western  Sahara;  and  Israel-Pales-
tine. The analysis will first focus on 
the activities, type of impact, and ef-
fectiveness of these organisations. 
It will go on to look at EU involve-
ment in the conflict and its interac-
tions with the selected CSOs. It will 
examine  in  particular  EU  activi-
ties under the ENP that help alter 
the  structure  within  which  CSOs 
operate, as well as their ability as 
agents, in order to test the hypoth-
eses above.
This will allow for a greater under-
standing of the ways in which the 
policies  provided  for  in  this  new 
EU initiative interact with the micro 
features of conflicts and thus con-
tribute  incentives  for  their  resolu-
tion, as set out in the ENP’s ambi-
tious objectives.
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